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Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby
By Lyman Johnson* and David Millon**
We evaluate the U.S. Supreme Court’s controversial decision in the Hobby Lobby case
from the perspective of state corporate law. We argue that the Court is correct in holding
that corporate law does not mandate that business corporations limit themselves to pursuit
of profit. Rather, state law allows incorporation for any lawful purpose. We elaborate on
this important point and also explain what it means for a corporation to “exercise religion.”
In addition, we address the larger implications of the Court’s analysis for an accurate un-
derstanding both of state law’s essentially agnostic stance on the question of corporate pur-
pose and also of the broad scope of managerial discretion.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a landmark June 30, 2014 ruling on religious liberty,1 the United States
Supreme Court spoke in unprecedented fashion to a foundational issue in cor-
porate law, the question of corporate purpose.2 To resolve a clash between
two important federal statutes—the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”)3 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)4—the Court en-
tered the very heart of state corporate law and addressed a debate that has raged
for decades.5 Rejecting the federal government’s position that “for-profit” busi-
ness corporations cannot “exercise religion” because their sole purpose is to
make money,6 the Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. construed state
corporate law as permitting a broad array of non-monetary objectives.7 Thus,
the Court reasoned, business corporations are “persons” under RFRA that can
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1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), aff ’g 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.
2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), rev’g 724 F.3d 377 (3d
Cir. 2013). The two cases were consolidated after the grant of certiorari. 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
2. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766–76; see infra Part III.B.
3. Pub. L. No. 114-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 25, 26, and 42
U.S.C.).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2012).
5. See infra Part III.
6. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769.
7. Id.
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“exercise religion” under that Act,8 and it held that the ACA’s contraceptive man-
date substantially burdened sincerely held religious beliefs.9
The Hobby Lobby decision has generated enormous controversy in both legal
and political circles,10 and Justice Ginsburg authored a fierce and lengthy dis-
sent.11 Undoubtedly, in the months ahead, much scholarly attention will be de-
voted to the intricacies of the Court’s RFRA analysis and what it reveals as to the
Justices’ current thinking about religious liberty inside as well as outside the
business setting.12 This is an important subject, as is the policy issue of ensur-
ing women’s access to contraceptive care under the ACA and to healthcare
generally.13
In this article we assess the implications of the Hobby Lobby decision from a
corporate law perspective. The Supreme Court very rarely takes up corporate
law issues of any kind and it has never spoken to the subject of corporate pur-
pose. Without the Court’s threshold holding that, as a matter of state corporate
law, business corporations can exercise religion because they need not solely
pursue profits,14 the RFRA claim in Hobby Lobby would have failed, and the
ACA’s contraceptive mandate would not have been struck down. With that ex-
pansive holding in Hobby Lobby, however, the consequences now radiate far be-
yond the context of religious liberty, healthcare, and women’s rights. Quite sim-
ply, by tackling for the first time the contentious issue of corporate purpose, the
Supreme Court relaunched a stalled conversation and the Hobby Lobby decision
will reverberate across corporate America. It will reshape fundamentally how
business people, lawyers, legal and business scholars (particularly, corporate
law professors),15 as well as ordinary citizens, think about the permitted objec-
tives of business corporations in a free society, objectives that extend far beyond
8. Id. at 2768–76.
9. Id. at 2774–79. From that conclusion, the Court went on to examine whether, in order to com-
ply with RFRA, the contraceptive mandate was the “least restrictive means” of furthering what the
Court assumed to be a “compelling governmental interest,” id. at 2779, and concluded it was not.
Id. at 2780–84. We do not address these issues in this article.
10. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Limits Birth Control Rule, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2014, at A1.
11. Hobby Lobby, 134 U.S. at 2787–2806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
12. In its October 2014 term, the Supreme Court took up another religious liberty case, Holt v.
Hobbs, 509 F. App’x 561 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1512 (Mar. 3, 2014) (No. 13-
6927). The case involves a RFRA challenge to the Arkansas no-beards in prison policy by a Salafi
Muslim. Id.
13. Democratic members of the House and Senate quickly introduced new legislation to counter
Hobby Lobby, the Protect Women’s Health from Corporate Interference Act of 2014. Ilyse Wolens
Schuman, Democratic Lawmakers Introduce Measure to Counter Hobby Lobby, LITTLER ( July 10,
2014), http://goo.gl/saZUni. With a Republican-controlled House, this bill likely has little hope of
success. In late August 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services issued proposed
rules aimed at permitting only a narrow group of business corporations to refuse on religious grounds
to provide certain contraceptive coverage to employees. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services
Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51092 (proposed Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510 & 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). The period for comments closed
on October 21, 2014, but as of the date of this article, no further agency action has been taken.
14. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
15. For example, a 2011 Brookings Institute study noted that the top twenty law schools and top
twenty business schools in the United States routinely teach that maximizing shareholder wealth is
(and should be) the primary purpose of the corporation. DARRELL M. WEST, BROOKINGS INST., THE
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those that are religiously motivated and into the larger realm of corporate social
responsibility of all kinds. This article explains why.
Part II identifies the two key corporate law issues at stake in Hobby Lobby: is a
business corporation a “person” under RFRA and can it “exercise religion”? This
Part describes the parties and the salient features of the three companies involved
in the litigation, and it explains how religious convictions in the corporate set-
ting created a conflict between the ACA and RFRA. Part III traces the heated,
decades-long debates over corporate personhood and corporate purpose, de-
bates the Supreme Court, at last, had to weigh in on to resolve the contraceptive
mandate issue. Part IV critically analyzes the scope and rationales of the Court’s
views on these corporate law subjects. Part V discusses the larger significance of
Hobby Lobby for corporate law and corporate theory, and identifies where linger-
ing uncertainty remains on the personhood and purpose issues. Part VI is a brief
conclusion.
II. THE CORPORATE LAW ISSUES IN HOBBY LOBBY
The consolidated Hobby Lobby cases presented two corporate law issues. First,
is a business corporation a “person” under RFRA? Second, can such a corporation
“exercise religion” under RFRA? In this Part, we describe how these questions
emerged and why they were so important. We note before doing so, however,
that both questions are federal law questions because RFRA, like the ACA, is a
federal statute. But resolution of the second issue—i.e., whether a corporation
can exercise religion—depends entirely on the permissible purposes of corporate
endeavor under state corporate law. The Court acknowledged this.16 And it is the
Court’s views on corporate law that make its ruling so momentous.
A. RFRA
RFRA was enacted in 1993,17 in response to the 1990 Supreme Court decision
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.18 The
Smith Court held that, under the First Amendment, “neutral, generally applicable
laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a com-
pelling governmental interest.”19 Smith thereby dramatically altered how the
Court analyzed the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.20
RFRA sought, statutorily, to counter Smith by providing that “[g]overnment
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden re-
sults from a rule of general applicability.”21 If the government does substantially
PURPOSE OF THE CORPORATION IN BUSINESS AND LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA 17–18 (2011), available at http://
goo.gl/GrxZIj.
16. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
17. See supra note 4.
18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a discussion of pre-Smith case law, see McDonnell, infra note 117.
19. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997).
20. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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burden a person’s exercise of religion, under RFRA, that person is entitled to an
exemption unless the government “demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”22
In 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act of 2000,23 which, among other things, broadened the definition of
the phrase “exercise of religion” in RFRA to include “any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”24
Given the text of RFRA and the 2000 amendment, it is plain to see the impor-
tance of the terms “person” and “exercise of religion” in determining the reach of
that Act’s protection against governmental encroachments on religious liberty.
B. ACA AND THE HHS CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE
Congress enacted the ACA—sometimes referred to as “Obamacare”—in
2010.25 It requires employers with fifty or more full-time employees to offer
“a group health plan or group health insurance coverage” that provides “mini-
mum essential coverage.”26 As noted by the Court, the ACA authorized the
Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”), a component of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), to establish
exemptions from the ACA for “religious employers” such as churches.27 HHS,
again acting under ACA auspices, also provided a somewhat similar (but not
identical) “accommodation” to religious nonprofit organizations, such as reli-
giously affiliated schools and hospitals.28
For all employers covered by the ACA, HRSA, pursuant to ACA authorization,
promulgated mandatory rules pertaining to the provision of contraception cov-
erage as an employee benefit.29 Under these rules, all nonexempt employers
were required to offer specified contraception coverage to their female employ-
ees.30 Four of the mandated methods of contraception may, the Court in Hobby
Lobby noted, “have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg from devel-
oping any further by inhibiting its attachment to the uterus.”31 Requiring access
to these four methods of contraception triggered the Hobby Lobby litigation.
22. See id. § 2000bb-1(b).
23. Id.
24. See id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
25. See supra note 3.
26. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f )(2) (2012); id. § 4980H(a), (c)(2).
27. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763 (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131
(a) (2014).
28. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763; 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b) (2014). This “accommodation”
has itself spawned substantial litigation. See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014)
(pending appellate review, Secretary of HHS enjoined from enforcing ACA if applicant Christian Col-
lege states that it is a nonprofit organization holding itself out as religious and has religious objections
to providing coverage for contraceptive services); see Robert Pear, A Two-Page Form Spurs an Ideolog-
ical Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2014, at 16.
29. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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C. THE THREE CORPORATIONS OBJECT
The Hobby Lobby decision was the culmination of litigation initiated by three
business corporations and their shareholders against HHS.32 In brief, they all ob-
jected to the four contraceptive methods noted, although they had no objection
to offering employee coverage for the sixteen other mandated methods of birth
control.33 The basis for the objection in all cases was a deeply held religious con-
viction that these four methods were life-ending abortifacients.34 The sincerity of
these beliefs was never questioned by the government or any court.35
Due to the objection, the corporations sought an exemption from the HHS
mandate with respect to the four government-mandated contraceptive methods.
The legal ground for seeking an exemption was RFRA. In each of the cases
below,36 the corporations themselves and their shareholders asserted that they
were “persons” under RFRA and that the HHS contraception mandate substan-
tially and impermissibly burdened their “exercise of religion.”
1. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
This company was organized in the late 1960s as an Oklahoma business cor-
poration by David and Barbara Green, husband and wife, devout evangelical
Christians. All of the voting stock is held by various family trusts, not directly
by the Greens themselves.37 The Greens and their adult children serve as trustees
of the trusts and all were required to sign a statement of faith—called a Trust
Commitment—before becoming trustees.38 The express language of the trust in-
strument itself also affirms the Christian faith.39 Thus, the controlling sharehold-
ers (the trusts), as well as the trustees who control the shareholder-trusts, each
memorialized a commitment to the Christian faith. David Green and three of the
Greens’ children serve as the four directors of Hobby Lobby. They also serve as
the company’s senior executive officers.40
32. Both the Court and Justice Ginsburg in her dissent repeatedly refer to the corporations in-
volved in this case as “for-profit” corporations. The Oklahoma corporation statute relevant to the
case, unlike the Pennsylvania statute, does not use this term to describe business corporations orga-
nized thereunder. Nor does the Delaware statute or the Model Business Corporation Act. Because the
term may be taken incorrectly to imply that business corporations must pursue profit at the expense
of competing considerations, except where we specifically discuss Conestoga Wood Specialties Cor-
poration and the Pennsylvania statute, we instead refer to corporations like Hobby Lobby as “business
corporations.”
33. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2779.
36. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d, 723
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394
(E.D. Pa. 2013), aff ’d, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).
37. 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 n.6.
38. 723 F.3d at 1122.
39. Id.
40. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765. It appears that Mrs. Green was not a director, even though
she was a trustee of the trusts that owned the stock. Thus, there is not complete identity between the
directors and the shareholders. Any reading of Hobby Lobby therefore that contends the case should
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Hobby Lobby has more than 13,000 employees and operates over 500 arts
and crafts stores.41 Thus, although it is a family-controlled, closely held corpo-
ration, it is, financially and otherwise, a substantial company. Forbes magazine,
for example, reports that it had 2013 revenues exceeding $3 billion.42 An affil-
iate, Mardel, Inc., also an Oklahoma business corporation, was started by one of
the Green’s sons. It operates thirty-five Christian bookstores and employs ap-
proximately 400 people.43 Like Hobby Lobby, it objected to the contraception
mandate.
Hobby Lobby has a written statement of corporate purpose.44 This statement
evinces a clear Christian emphasis along with a notable multi-stakeholder thrust.
It expresses a commitment to “[h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the
company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles,” while offering custom-
ers exceptional value and service, serving employees and their families while
sharing blessings with them, investing in the community, and providing a return
on the owners’ investment.45 This corporate statement is separate from that of
the trusts that own the stock in Hobby Lobby.
Conspicuously, in the statement of corporate purpose, a return for sharehold-
ers appears last and only is one of several purposes identified by Hobby Lobby,
and nothing whatsoever is said in that statement about “maximizing” the return
to investors. Moreover, if the company is sold, only 10 percent of the sales pro-
ceeds are to go to the stockholder-trusts, while 90 percent will be paid to char-
ity.46 About one-third of the corporation’s annual profits already are contributed
to charity, and the company pays its employees no less than $14 per hour, al-
most twice the minimum wage.47 Both Hobby Lobby and Mardel, moreover,
are closed on Sundays due to religious beliefs, an action Mr. Green calculated
costs several million dollars a year in lost profits for the business.48 The compa-
nies neither seek to maximize profits nor do they actually do so.
2. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation
The third corporate litigant was Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation. Nor-
man and Elizabeth Hahn organized this company as a Pennsylvania for-profit
be limited to companies where shareholders are coextensive with the directors would be a flawed
interpretation of the decision.
41. Id. These figures stem from the litigation record. See 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1284. According to
Forbes, however, as of the end of 2013, Hobby Lobby employed over 23,000 people. See America’s
Largest Private Companies 2013, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/largest-private-
companies.
42. See supra note 41.
43. 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
44. See Statement of Purpose, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/our_company/purpose.
cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
45. Id.
46. Brian Solomon, David Green: The Biblical Billionaire Backing the Evangelical Movement, FORBES
(Sept. 18, 2012, 7:51 AM), http://goo.gl/.
47. Janet Adamy, Are Firms Entitled to Religious Protections?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2014, 10:33 PM),
http://goo.gl/VcLScW.
48. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014).
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business corporation in the early 1960s.49 The Hahns, members of a Mennonite
denomination of Christians, own all of the company’s voting stock, and they
serve as members of its board of directors.50 One of their sons serves as the Pres-
ident and CEO.51
Conestoga’s board of directors adopted a Statement on the Sanctity of Life ex-
pressing the view that “human life begins at conception.”52 The company’s mis-
sion, moreover, is articulated in a Vision and Values Statement affirming that the
corporation will act to ensure a “reasonable profit” as gained in a “manner that
reflects [a] Christian heritage.”53 As with the Hobby Lobby and Mardel corpora-
tions, the founders and directors of Conestoga Wood operate the company in
accordance with sincerely held “religious beliefs and moral principles.”54 The
pursuit of profits, moreover, is stated not to be the sole purpose of Conestoga,
and the company does not seek to maximize profits.
Given the three companies’ rejection of profit maximization as a corporate ob-
jective,55 in their resistance to the contraception mandate a central question
was whether a business corporation could even invoke the protection of RFRA
by claiming to be a “person” that seeks to “exercise religion.” The federal govern-
ment argued that so-called “for-profit” corporations neither are “persons” under
RFRA, nor, given that they exist for the purpose of making money, could such
companies “exercise religion.”56 The issue was thus squarely joined on these
questions, and, as Part III explains by way of background, this brought to the
Supreme Court a longstanding and unendingly controversial issue of signal im-
portance for corporate law: must business corporations act solely to maximize
profits, or may they pursue other non-pecuniary objectives?
III. STATE LAW ON CORPORATE PERSONHOOD AND PURPOSE
Corporate personhood and corporate purpose are related concepts. The idea
of a corporation as a “person” expresses that the corporation possesses a separate
legal identity, distinct from the persons associated with it. Corporate purpose
49. Id. at 2764.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377, 382 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013).
53. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766.
54. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
55. Numerous amicus briefs were filed on behalf of these companies arguing that corporate law
permits the pursuit of non-monetary objectives and that many businesses do so. See, e.g., Brief of Pa-
cific Legal Foundation at 10−26, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2012) (No.
13-354); Brief of National Religious Broadcasters at 11–16, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751 (2012) (No. 13-354); Brief of National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs at
1–17, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2012) (No. 13-354).
56. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767–72. Numerous amicus briefs supported the government in
this regard and argued against RFRA as a shield from the contraception mandate for business corpo-
rations. See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Accountability Center, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2012) (No. 13-354); Brief of Jewish Social Policy Action Network, Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2012) (No. 13-354); Brief of Brennan Center for Justice at New
York University, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2012) (No. 13-354).
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reflects the particular objective(s) sought to be achieved by cooperative human
endeavor through the corporate form. Central to the Hobby Lobby case was
whether business corporations are “persons” under RFRA, a federal statute,
and if so, whether they have the power to “exercise” religion. As described in
this Part, corporate personhood is well established, as is the broad power of cor-
porations to pursue a range of corporate purposes besides profit maximization.
A. CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
It is beyond dispute that corporations—business corporations as well as non-
profit corporations—are persons in the eyes of the law. This means that they
enjoy a legal status separate and distinct from the human beings who are asso-
ciated with them. So, for example, corporations own property, enter into con-
tracts, and commit torts. They can sue and be sued in their own right. They
are subject to penalties if they violate applicable criminal laws. They must com-
ply with a vast array of federal and state regulations. Unless tax-exempt status
has been conferred upon them, they are subject to income tax liability on the
net income generated by their commercial activities. Corporations also possess
rights conferred upon them by state and federal statutes and enjoy certain
state and federal constitutional protections. In other words, the rights and obli-
gations of corporations are not simply those of their shareholders, officers, direc-
tors, employees, or other humans who participate in or are affected by the cor-
poration’s activities.
Much ink has been spilled over the metaphysical question of the nature of cor-
porate personality.57 Are corporations entities in their own right or merely aggre-
gations of human beings who are associated with each other in a joint endeavor?
If they are entities, are they “natural” rather than merely “artificial”? We need not
concern ourselves with these theoretical debates, noting only that corporate law
unambiguously treats corporations as possessing distinct legal identities separate
from the human beings who have chosen to act jointly through the device of
incorporation.
As creatures of positive law, corporate persons exist to pursue the purposes
chosen by their human founders. State law specifies the purposes for which cor-
porations may be organized. Importantly, it does little to limit the organizers’
choices. Delaware’s business corporation statute is typical in providing that
“[a] corporation may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct
or promote any lawful business or purposes, except as may otherwise be pro-
vided by the Constitution or other law of this State.”58 As probed in greater
depth in Part IV, the Pennsylvania and Oklahoma statutes governing the corpo-
rations involved in the Hobby Lobby case are to the same effect, despite differ-
ences in language.59
57. See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201.
58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011).
59. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 131) (“Cor-
porations may be incorporated under this subpart for any lawful purpose or purposes.”); OKLA. STAT.
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Having conferred extremely broad freedom of choice on the corporation’s or-
ganizers, state corporate law then specifies the powers that corporate persons
may lawfully exercise in furtherance of their purposes. Some statutes define cor-
porate powers in general terms. For example, the Pennsylvania statute involved
in Hobby Lobby as well as the Model Business Corporation Act provide that cor-
porate persons possess the same powers or capacity as natural persons.60 These
are default provisions that could be subject to carve-outs or qualifications where
state legislatures think it appropriate to do so. Other corporate statutes take a
different approach, providing a list of the corporation’s powers. Delaware’s stat-
ute takes this form.61
As persons that exist only by virtue of law, corporations obviously lack the
ability to pursue their purposes and exercise their lawfully delegated powers
without the assistance of human beings. The corporate person can do nothing
unless human beings act on its behalf. In this sense, corporate persons are arti-
ficial (or “fictitious”) in comparison with human (“natural”) persons. Corporate
law therefore provides a governance framework that specifies who can act law-
fully on behalf of the corporation. The board of directors is the primary locus of
governance authority. The board acts for the corporation, sometimes in its own
capacity and more often through delegation of authority to other humans,
namely the corporation’s senior officers and those to whom they in turn have
delegated authority.
As a practical matter, statutory specifications of corporate power define the
scope of the powers of those natural persons who possess the lawful authority
to act on the corporation’s behalf. To say, for example, that a corporation has
the power to file a lawsuit in its own right or to acquire property is to say in ef-
fect that the board of directors possesses the authority to exercise these rights on
the corporation’s behalf. Similarly, if those with the requisite authority deem phi-
lanthropy to be among a corporation’s purposes, it is up to the board of directors
to exercise the corporation’s statutory power62 to make charitable donations.
In addition to the specification of the corporation’s powers, positive law also
confers rights and legal protections on corporate persons. Thus, for example, the
Supreme Court has held that corporations enjoy many—but not all—of the con-
stitutional rights enjoyed by human beings. State and federal statutes also pro-
vide privileges for corporate persons such as, for example, eligibility for govern-
ment contract work and entitlement to income tax credits and deductions. These
constitutional and statutory provisions often confer rights to act, such as the
right to spend corporate funds on political campaigns.63 As is the case with
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1002, 1005 (West, Westlaw current with chapters of the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 54th
Leg.) (“[E]very corporation, whether profit or not for profit” may “be incorporated or organized . . .
to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes.”).
60. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1501 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 131); MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2014).
61. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2011).
62. See, e.g., id.
63. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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corporate powers, those human actors whom the law authorizes to act on the
corporation’s behalf exercise corporate rights.
B. CORPORATE PURPOSE
The question in the Hobby Lobby cases of whether RFRA applies to business
corporations depends primarily on whether they are able to “exercise religion.”
The fact that a fictitious legal entity cannot pray or attend a synagogue is irrele-
vant to this question. If the corporation is empowered by state law to exercise
religion, then it does so through its legally authorized representatives, just as
it does when it exercises any other lawful power.
The issue therefore is whether state corporate law authorizes business corpo-
rations to exercise religion. As noted above, this is important because in Hobby
Lobby the government argued that business corporations lack the lawful author-
ity to do anything other than pursue financial gain. The argument resonates with
the claims of conservative corporate law academics who assert that corporate law
mandates profit maximization. According to this view, the financial interests of
shareholders take precedence over all competing considerations. However, if
state corporate law does not authorize the exercise of religion, religious obser-
vance or activities would be proscribed even if they do not compromise share-
holder financial interests or actually promote them. Thus, as background to
the Hobby Lobby Court’s treatment of this issue, here we briefly describe state
corporate law bearing on corporate purpose.
State corporate law does not require corporations to prioritize profits over
competing considerations. This fact has ramifications that extend far beyond
the particular activities—religious observance—at issue in the Hobby Lobby
cases. All business corporations (and non-profits too, for that matter) must gen-
erate profit in order to survive. That is simply a fact of life. But corporate law
confers on them broad discretion to determine the extent to which they choose
to temper the pursuit of profit by regard for other values.
Delaware corporate law, the most influential body of law for United States
publicly held corporations, does not mandate shareholder wealth maximization.
The statute says no such thing. There is virtually no judge-made precedent to
that effect. One recent trial court opinion does speak of shareholder wealth max-
imization as a statutory mandate, but the analysis is not persuasive and is not
likely to be influential.64 In deciding eBay’s suit against craigslist, Chancellor
Chandler states that, “[h]aving chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist
directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that
form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation
for the benefit of its stockholders.”65 Chancellor Chandler then goes on to
make a far stronger statement. Corporate policies that seek “not to maximize
64. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). For a thorough
critique of this decision, see Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judg-
ment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 439–44 (2013).
65. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 34.
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the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders” are invalid.66 In other words, not only is corporate management
legally required to pursue profit, it must also seek to maximize the shareholders’
financial interests. The Court cites no statutory provision or case law in support
of these sweeping assertions. The Delaware corporation statute includes no such
mandate and does not even refer to corporations organized under it as “for-
profit” entities, the phrase used by Chancellor Chandler. To the contrary, as
noted in Subpart A above, the statute states expressly that “[a] corporation
may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote
any lawful business or purposes.”67 No other Delaware Chancery or Supreme
Court decision has squarely endorsed shareholder wealth maximization in the
stark terms used by the court in this case.68
Further, the court’s endorsement of shareholder wealth maximization in the
craigslist case may have very limited relevance. The facts of the case were eccen-
tric given the defensive measures adopted by the board of directors in that case;
read narrowly, the opinion insists on the shareholder wealth maximization idea
in a highly unusual case involving a closely held corporation whose founders
had explicitly chosen to eschew profit in order to pursue a social mission.
Thus the opinion might be read simply to condemn corporate policies that are
entirely and expressly contrary to shareholder financial interests, although
even then the decision lacks legal support. Such circumstances are rare to say
the least; business corporations pursuing social missions at the expense of share-
holder value are far more likely to sacrifice some amount of profit without reject-
ing that objective entirely and are likely also to justify such policies with refer-
ence to long-run shareholder financial interests, even if the claim is vague and
not susceptible to proof. Under the business judgment rule, policies of this
kind would not be condemned even if shareholder wealth maximization were
the law.69
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011).
68. One trial court opinion states in passing that “[i]t is the obligation of directors to attempt,
within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s stockholders.” Katz v. Oak
Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). However, that case involved the contractual rights
of bondholders and as such did not speak directly to the question of shareholder rights vis-á-vis com-
peting considerations. Furthermore, the reference to “long-run interests” confers broad discretion on
management to pursue policies that shareholders preferring short-term share price maximization
might find objectionable.
In a forthcoming article, Chief Justice Leo Strine and Professor Nicholas Walker argue that advancing
shareholder wealth is consistent with what they call “conservative corporate theory.” Leo E. Strine, Jr. &
Nicholas Walker, Conservative Collision Course? The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory
and Citizens United (Harvard L. Sch. John M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 788, 2014), available at http://
goo.gl/cstZzu. They cite a number of theorists but, outside the unusual sale of control context, they cite
no legal authority squarely holding that shareholder wealth (or corporate profits) must be maximized.
We submit that there is none. They also sometimes state that shareholder wealth is to be “maximized”
and sometimes only that it is to be “advanced.” Id. at 19 n.34. And they acknowledge that in a majority
of states the law does not mandate shareholder wealth as the sole corporate end. Id. Finally, and most
critical for our purposes, they agree that the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby explicitly held “that profit is
not the sole end of corporate governance.” Id. at 13 n.13.
69. Elsewhere in the craigslist opinion, Chancellor Chandler writes,
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It should be noted further that even a narrow reading of the court’s endorse-
ment of shareholder wealth maximization is quite problematic. eBay, the plaintiff
minority shareholder, invested in craigslist with full knowledge that profit max-
imization was not that corporation’s objective. This was not, in other words, a
case in which those in control of a profit-seeking corporation chose to change
direction to the prejudice of existing minority shareholders. One might argue
that eBay implicitly assented to craigslist’s disavowal of shareholder wealth max-
imization when it invested with knowledge of the founders’ social mission.
The typical citation for the shareholder wealth maximization claim is not a
Delaware case. It is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., decided by the Michigan Supreme
Court nearly 100 years ago.70 That decision, without citing precedent, states that
“[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the benefit of
the stockholders. The powers of directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end,
and does not extend to a change in the end itself . . . .”71 Despite the frequency
with which the case is cited by commentators, by its terms, it does not mandate
wealth maximization and no Delaware court has cited it as authority for a legal
duty to maximize shareholder wealth.72 The general statement quoted here also
is not necessary to the decision of the case, which appears to be a case involving
oppression of minority shareholders in a closely held corporation. The control-
ling shareholder—Henry Ford—adopted a policy for Ford Motor Company to
forgo a large amount of profits and their distribution in favor of retaining em-
ployees and advancing conflicting social objectives, to the detriment of the
Dodge brothers’ arguably legitimate expectations. The shareholder wealth max-
imization idea did not need to be invoked to protect minority shareholders in
that case or in similar cases.
Further, even viewed as a minority shareholder oppression case, the Dodge v.
Ford decision may simply be wrong. There is no plausible claim that Henry Ford
was using his control of the corporation to treat the Dodge brothers unfairly.
Even after adoption of Ford’s new policies, the Dodge brothers were to continue
to receive annual dividends of $120,000 on an initial investment of $200,000,
an astonishingly rich annual return of 60 percent. And, although the corporation
was earning profits far in excess of the planned distributions and might have
earned even more in the short term, the corporation’s management had chosen
to reinvest a large share of those profits in new capital assets. This sounds on the
When director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this Court will not
question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder interests—be it through
making a charitable contribution, paying employees higher salaries and benefits, or more
general norms like promoting a particular corporate culture—ultimately promote stockholder
value.
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 33.
70. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
71. Id. at 684.
72. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 27 (2012).
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face of it like just the kind of decision that the business judgment rule ought to
have protected.
Delaware’s lack of commitment to shareholder wealth maximization is also ev-
ident in various doctrines that insulate management from accountability to the
corporation’s shareholders. As a practical matter, the demand requirement in de-
rivative litigation, the business judgment rule, and the statutory provision for ex-
culpation from monetary liability for breach of the duty of care73 insulate man-
agement from liability to shareholders except in cases involving severe conflict of
interest or bad faith. Directors’ fiduciary duties are owed not to the shareholders
alone but rather to “the corporation and its shareholders.”74 Vague as this for-
mulation might be, it does express the notion that management acts not only
on behalf of the shareholders but also on behalf of the corporate entity as a
whole; part of its job is to make choices in cases where corporate and share-
holder interests diverge. As currently structured, except for atypical cases of co-
ordinated institutional shareholder activism, the voting rights regime does not
seriously threaten incumbent management of public companies because of col-
lective action costs and rational apathy that discourage shareholder insurgency.
Nor does the prospect of a hostile takeover create a strong incentive to maximize
share value; Delaware common law accords target company boards of directors
broad discretion to adopt potent defensive measures.75 The Revlon duty76
to maximize current share value arises only in a narrow range of circum-
stances—certain sales of the company—that corporate boards are free to avoid
if they so wish, and in contemporary practice the case is of limited significance
for directors.77
In our view, then, Delaware law is agnostic on the question of corporate
purpose. Although dictum in Revlon mentions “benefits accruing to stockhold-
ers” neither that case nor any other Supreme Court authority mandates share-
holder wealth maximization outside the Revlon setting. Nor does it endorse a
stakeholder-focused alternative, for example, by requiring that management
somehow balance the competing interests of all the corporation’s various constit-
uencies. To the contrary, we see Delaware as providing expressly for broad free-
dom of choice as to corporate purpose. Those who form a corporation are free to
specify particular purposes in the organizational documents, subject only to the
requirement that those purposes be “lawful,”78 or they can leave the matter
open-ended, stating simply that “the purpose of the corporation is to engage
in any lawful act or activity.”79 In the latter case, it will be up to the board of
73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
74. See, e.g., Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff ’d, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
75. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
76. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The court in
Revlon did state, in dicta, that a “board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.” Id. at 182.
But the court said nothing about “maximizing” shareholder wealth.
77. Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167 (2014).
78. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b), 102(a)(3) (2011).
79. Id. § 102(a)(3).
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directors, exercising its statutory responsibility to direct the corporation’s “busi-
ness and affairs,”80 to determine questions of corporate purpose.81
Beyond Delaware, the open-ended nature of corporate purpose is even more
clear. A majority of states have enacted various versions of a “constituency stat-
ute.”82 These statutes empower—but do not require—corporate management to
consider nonshareholder as well as shareholder interests in directing the corpo-
ration’s business. Either expressly or by clear implication, they reject the share-
holder wealth maximization conception of management responsibility, confer-
ring broad discretion to sacrifice profits for alternative objectives.
Despite the absence of persuasive legal authority, corporate law scholars fre-
quently claim not only that the law requires shareholder wealth maximization
but also that corporate law designates management as the agents of the corpora-
tion’s shareholders. According to this view, the inevitable costs that arise when-
ever a principal must rely on an agent—the likelihood of shirking and the need
to monitor the agent’s performance—are termed “agency costs” and are a poten-
tially significant drag on shareholder wealth. Like the maximization claim, the
agency characterization also lacks legal foundation. In legal discourse, it is trace-
able to the work of Daniel Fischel and Frank Easterbrook working at the Univer-
sity of Chicago during the later part of the 1970s.83 Drawing on an article by
financial economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling,84 first Professor
Fischel and then Professor Fischel writing with Professor (later Judge) Easter-
brook argued that the job of corporate management, as agent of the sharehold-
ers, is to maximize the value of their investments in the corporation.85 Although
Jensen and Meckling used the agency idea in a non-legal sense and offered no
legal basis for the agency characterization, Fischel and Easterbrook seized
upon the agency cost idea and proceeded to analyze virtually all of corporate
law from that perspective.86 Since then, the shareholder wealth maximization
assumption and the fixation on agency costs have taken root and flourished
within the corporate law academy—despite some notable dissenters87—and
has been described as “the dominant framework of analysis for corporate law
80. Id. § 141(a).
81. The only limits on this power are the fiduciary obligations of care and loyalty and the doctrine
of waste. The question of “waste” would be determined by evaluating director conduct against the
expressed corporate purpose.
82. See Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ.
L. REV. 823, 833 (2003) (noting that Pennsylvania became the first state to pass a constituency statute
in 1983). See generally 1 JAMES COX & THOMAS HAZEN, TREATISE OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4.10, at
245 (2010).
83. For discussion of the origins of the agency theory in corporate law discourse and a critical per-
spective, see David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013).
84. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
85. FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 15–22 (1991).
86. See Millon, supra note 83, at 1025−34 (discussing the origins of Easterbrook and Fischel’s
agency theory of management’s relationship to shareholders).
87. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247 (1999); Einer R. Elhauge, Sacrificing Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733,
738 (2005); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate
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and corporate governance today.”88 Similarly, business leaders, business school
academics, and the business press typically take for granted the legitimacy of
shareholder wealth maximization and the idea of management as the sharehold-
ers’ agent, despite the absence of legal authority. In the face of these widely held
though incorrect assumptions, the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby was called
upon to address the question of corporate purpose under state law. We turn
now to its analysis.
IV. THE HOBBY LOBBY OPINION
To resolve the RFRA claims, the Court necessarily had to address both the cor-
porate personhood and corporate purpose issues. The federal government,
through HHS, the Court observed, saw these questions in quite simple terms:
“the companies cannot sue because they seek to make a profit for their owners,
and the owners cannot be heard because the regulations . . . apply only to the
companies and not to the owners as individuals.”89 In effect, HHS argued, to
preserve religious liberty a business individual must forgo operating through
the corporate form. Such a person would thus face a Hobson’s choice: he or
she might conduct business as a sole proprietor (or general partnership) and re-
tain religious liberty, or elect to conduct business through the corporate form
and relinquish that liberty.90 Preservation of religious liberty in the business set-
ting therefore requires, under the HHS view, that merchants exercise what the
Court called a “difficult choice.”91 The Court swiftly concluded that Congress
did nothing of the kind in RFRA, an act designed to provide “broad protection
for religious liberty.”92
A. THE CORPORATION AS PERSON
In light of the established legal framework recognizing corporations as “per-
sons” under state law,93 in Hobby Lobby the initial issue as to whether corpora-
tions fell within the protective mantle of RFRA was a straightforward question of
statutory construction. The Court was called upon to decide whether that stat-
ute’s reference to “persons” embraces corporate persons as well as human
ones, just as state corporate law routinely does.
The Court began by stating that while Congress in RFRA employed a familiar
legal fiction in defining corporations as “persons,” the purpose of doing so was
to provide protection for human beings.94 This is so, the Court said, because a
Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 233 (1990);
STOUT, supra note 72.
88. Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325,
1326 (2013).




93. See supra Part III.A.
94. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767.
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corporation is “simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve
desired ends.”95 Consequently, when rights are extended to corporations, “the
purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”96 Importantly, the Court stated
that the rights of “these people” were those of the humans who “own and control
those companies.”97
The Court did not explain the basis for its equation of corporate rights with
those of humans. Because of the potential for confusion, we believe this point
warrants further explanation. The key idea is that the “rights” of “these people”
to exercise religion that are protected by the statute are those rights to act that
they possess in their corporate capacity. It is in the particular role of being “as-
sociated with a corporation,”98 including as “shareholders, officers, and employ-
ees,”99 that humans in the corporate context are protected by statutes conferring
rights on corporations. Roles performed outside the corporate context give rise to
no such protections any more than, by analogy, the same person playing baseball
with eight others is engaged in the same activity—or has the same role, respon-
sibilities, and objectives—as when playing soccer with eight others. Roles, orga-
nizational structure, and the decisionmaking process are all quite different for
humans interacting in the corporate setting than outside it. But the human desire
to express religious convictions in the corporate milieu may be no less fervent, as
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence underscored: plaintiffs “deem it necessary to ex-
ercise their religious beliefs within the context of their own closely-held for-
profit corporation.”100 Analytically, in order to preserve the separateness of
the corporation as a legal person distinct in a meaningful way from the humans
associated with it, while still acknowledging their desires for religious expres-
sion, the Court emphasized here, and throughout the opinion, the corporate ca-
pacity and corporate positions and roles played by these humans. The Court thus
upheld the institutional heft of the corporation as a distinct legal person under
95. Id. at 2768.
96. Id.
97. Id. Here and elsewhere in the majority opinion and in the principal dissent, shareholders are
referred to as the corporation’s “owners” even though there is no legal basis for this oft-used refer-
ence. Shareholders own the corporation’s stock but not the corporation itself. The corporation
holds title to and owns its own assets. The distinction can be important because ownership of
the corporation could imply stronger control and financial rights than corporate law actually
provides.
98. Id.
99. Id. Of course, in U.S. corporate governance, employees as such have no role; their rights and
obligations stem from contract and employment law. See Mark Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2491, 2500 (2005) (in corporate law, “[m]anagers and shareholders get to play; no one else
does”).
100. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring). We note that Justice Kennedy’s
statement is at odds with Chief Justice Strine’s much narrower, and we believe incorrect, view that
business people do not express moral values by investing in business corporations. Strine & Walker,
supra note 68, at 21. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, invoked a strong version of distinctive corporate
personhood, arguing that by incorporating a business, “an individual separates herself from the en-
tity.” Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Only Justice Sotomayor joined the corporate law portion
of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. Justices Breyer and Kagan joined all other parts of her dissent, however.
Id. at 2806 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., dissenting). Thus, the overall vote on the corporate law aspect of the
case was 5-2.
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RFRA, and did not simply disregard it by making it indistinguishable from its
human participants.
This critical theoretical point could have been made far stronger and more
readily comprehensible in either of two ways. First, the Court easily could
have referred to the very corporate laws under which Hobby Lobby, Mardel,
and Conestoga were incorporated, those of Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. Penn-
sylvania’s statute, under which Conestoga was incorporated, provides a useful
illustration. By statute, Pennsylvania corporations expressly are stated to have
the same “legal capacity” as natural persons.101 This is similar to section 3.02
of the Model Business Corporation Act, which confers on corporations “the
same powers as an individual.”102 Under Pennsylvania law, therefore, business
corporations have both a distinct legal identity separate from the individuals in-
volved in it and the legal capacity to do whatever natural persons can do. Be-
cause it is not disputed that individuals are free to exercise religion, in having
the same “legal capacity” as individuals, corporations also have the legal capacity
to exercise religion.
Having defined corporate power in these terms, the Pennsylvania statute,103
again like the Model Business Corporation Act,104 then provides that all such
powers are to be “exercised by” the board of directors. Since only human beings
can serve as directors of a corporation, when those humans act in their director
capacity, they are acting in their corporate role, “exercising” corporate powers;
they are not acting on their own behalf. As those humans exercise corporate
functions, they can, of course, also “exercise” all of the myriad actions of reli-
gious people in other settings—including praying, worshiping, and observing
sacraments105—but, in doing so, they act in their representative “corporate”
role and “corporate” capacity, as always is the case when a corporation’s board
of directors acts within its lawful capacity. Thus, humans, alone or communally,
can simultaneously “exercise” religion while “exercising” corporate functions.
Here,106 the very language (“exercise”) of religious liberty corresponds exactly
with what humans do in directing corporate affairs.
101. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1501 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 131).
102. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2014).
103. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1721 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 131).
104. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (2014).
105. The Third Circuit in the Conestoga case had said that corporations “do not pray, worship,
observe sacraments.” Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir.
2013). The Supreme Court, after quoting that language, said it was “quite beside the point.”
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. This is so because, apart from humans acting in corporate capacity,
and therefore acting on behalf of the corporation, corporations can do nothing. Id. Our point, how-
ever, is that the board of directors as a collective body can, of course, like any group of persons, pray
together, engage in worship, and observe sacraments together.
106. The “exercise of religion” phrasing is used both in RFRA and in the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. The Hobby Lobby family—the Greens—made just this point about directing cor-
porate affairs, in arguing that they “cannot in good conscience direct their corporations to provide
insurance coverage for the four drugs and devices at issue because doing so would ‘facilitat[e]
harms against human beings.’” Brief for Respondent at 31, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) (citing Pet. App. 14a.).
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Appreciating this crucial point about corporate role serves not only to preserve
the distinctive legal personhood and institutional significance of the corporation
as a modern actor, it also helps to differentiate as legally and conceptually mean-
ingful the myriad actions taken by humans in different settings, whether busi-
ness or otherwise. The same humans who serve as directors of a corporation
also serve in other multifarious social roles—parent, spouse, colleague, and so
on—and when they do so, they are not acting in corporate capacity. The iden-
tical point, of course, can be made as to other actions taken in corporate capac-
ity, such as those of shareholders or officers.107 We need a legal vocabulary to
make these important distinctions of setting and role in a society with so
many collective actors, of which business corporations are only one type.
Second, the Court in Hobby Lobby could have taken a different approach, and
more pointedly and formally emphasized that the RFRA right to “exercise reli-
gion” was the right of the corporate person itself, not those of the human direc-
tors and officers who control it—by acting on its behalf—or of the shareholders
who own its stock or of the employees who work for it or of any other human
associated with the corporation in some way. To be sure, legal protections con-
ferred on corporations will typically benefit some natural persons in some way,
but the existence of the corporate right has nothing to do with the existence or
not of the rights of those humans who have chosen to pursue joint purposes by
organizing a corporation. More particularly, the religious liberties of those indi-
viduals involved in these corporations are already the subject of undoubted legal
protection outside the corporation. If the corporation itself enjoys religious lib-
erty, its rights exist separately and in addition to those protections, and would
exist even if some—or even all—of its shareholders or directors were atheists
and derived no benefit from the corporation’s exercise of its own right.
This distinction is not simply a matter of semantics or formalism. The question
could be important if one were to read the Court’s opinion as stating that the
scope of a corporation’s legal right is dependent on the extent to which that
right actually protects the interests and values of humans associated with the cor-
poration. In Hobby Lobby, for example, applying RFRA protects the religious lib-
erty of the family members who formed and control the corporations, but it is
quite possible that it has no such effect on many of these companies’ employees,
at least some of whom may not share their religious commitments. For such em-
ployees, there would be no benefit and only the cost of denial of access to certain
health care benefits. If the scope of the RFRA depends on its purpose and that
purpose is to protect the religious liberty of all persons associated with a corpo-
ration, application of the statute in this case would not have been appropriate.
Limiting, as the Court did, the inquiry to whether application protects only the
religious liberty of the corporations’ “owners and controllers” merely invites the
question why their interests alone—ignoring those of the thousands of other hu-
mans associated with these corporations—should provide the relevant criterion.
107. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28 (2014) (shareholders elect directors); id. § 8.41 (offi-
cers perform the functions prescribed by the board of directors).
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Perhaps the Court at times seemingly equates the statutory rights of the cor-
porations involved in the Hobby Lobby case with those of their “owners and con-
trollers” because, as we noted above, the directors exercise control over the cor-
poration and thus advance its chosen purposes. In exercising corporate control,
directors may be motivated by religious commitment. Or perhaps the Court em-
phasizes shareholders because they first formed these entities in order to pursue
religious as well as commercial objectives. Application of the statute certainly
protects the interests of both overlapping groups of people, shareholders and di-
rectors. While that observation is true, it is beside the point if, as in Hobby Lobby,
the distinctive rights of the corporations themselves are at stake. When humans
choose to associate with each other by forming a corporation, they create a legal
entity whose rights and duties are separate and distinct from their own. When
directors or the corporation’s agents act on its behalf, they act in their corpo-
rate capacity and not as individuals. The existence or not of these corpora-
tions’ statutory rights has nothing to do with whether particular humans are
benefited.
The idea of the corporation as a distinct rights-bearing entity—with rights that
exist independently of those humans who are associated with it—might seem
puzzling when the rights involve political speech or religious exercise, but it
should not be. It is not any stranger than imagining a corporate person owning
legal title to a building, filing a lawsuit in its name, or making a charitable dona-
tion. In each of these cases, if state law empowers the corporation to act, the cor-
poration does so through the actions of its lawfully designated human represen-
tatives as carried out in accordance with the statutory governance structure. The
key question therefore is whether the corporation possesses the power to act.
This, of course, is a question for state corporate law, which long ago accorded
broad powers to business corporations to do more than simply seek to maximize
profits, as we explained in Part III.B.
Despite the potentially confusing emphasis on the rights of the humans who
direct the corporations’ affairs and own its stock, the Court’s analysis sufficiently
accomplishes its chosen goal of recognizing corporate separateness as furthering
the true aim of granting protection to natural persons, even if its treatment of this
slippery but crucial notion could have been significantly strengthened in the
ways we indicate. And, although the Court does not fully explain how the inter-
ests of humans (and which ones) within a corporation are needed to support the
conclusion that the corporation itself thereby is a rights-bearing person, there is
little doubt that, as an alternative, it could have quite easily reached that conclu-
sion without relying on that idea.
The Court ended its brief “person” analysis by noting that the federal Diction-
ary Act, which governed in the absence of RFRA’s own definition, clearly in-
cluded “corporation” within the meaning of that word.108 Given as well that non-
profit corporations clearly have RFRA and free exercise rights,109 a point the
108. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
109. Id.
Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby 19
government did not strenuously dispute, the Court saw no conceivable basis for
including natural persons and non-profit corporations within the term “person”
while excluding business corporations.110 Overall, although it left much unex-
plained, the Court had little trouble concluding that business corporations
were “persons” under RFRA. This of course was consistent with the long-held
understanding of state corporate law.
B. CORPORATE RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
The chief argument made by HHS against the three companies was that they
cannot “exercise religion” under RFRA. The nub of the argument, and one agreed
with by several lower court judges,111 was that RFRA does not protect business
(“for-profit”) corporations “because the purpose of such corporations is simply
to make money.”112 According to this view, business corporations lack the
power to exercise religion, not simply because religion can interfere with profit
seeking but because religious exercise is unauthorized by state law without re-
gard to whether it results in lower profits. That position, of course, does not
merely preclude the exercise of religion; it precludes the pursuit of any and
all other non-pecuniary goals as well.
The Court dispatched this argument in a few short paragraphs, addressing for
the first time an issue that has sharply divided scholars for decades.113 The Court
began by stating correctly that the government’s contention “flies in the face of
modern corporate law.”114 Acknowledging that although “a” central objective
of business corporations is to “make” money,115 the Court did not regard that
as the only legally permissible goal. Instead, the Court noted that “modern cor-
porate law does not require business corporations to pursue profit at the expense
of everything else, and many do not do so.”116 The Court observed that many
business corporations support charitable causes and pursue humanitarian and
altruistic objectives.117 Notably, the Court did not say that corporations may ad-
vance those objectives only as a means to maximize profits; nor did the Court say
that doing so was in some way consistent with the overarching aim of making
110. Id. at 2769.
111. Id. at 2770 n.23 (citing cases).
112. Id. at 2771.
113. See supra Part III.B.
114. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770. The Court cited as authority two corporate law treatises
that, in turn, simply cited state general incorporation laws. Id. at 2771.
115. Id.
116. Id. The Court here is disagreeing with the view set forth in a forthcoming article by Chief
Justice Leo Strine that people do not invest in corporations to express moral values. Strine & Walker,
supra note 68, at 21. That goal was at the heart of the three companies’ purposes in the Hobby Lobby
cases.
117. Id. As Professor Brett McDonnell points out in his article on the Hobby Lobby decision, it is
the board of directors that decides whether to make charitable contributions, just as the board de-
cides most matters pertaining to a corporation’s business and affairs. Brett McDonnell, The Liberal
Case for Hobby Lobby (Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1439, 2014), available at
http://goo.gl/idyn82. This is important as a reminder that the key decision-making body for a corpo-
ration’s “exercise of religion” is the board, not the shareholders.
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profits.118 The language was far stronger. When the pursuit of profits comes “at
the expense of everything else,”119 the corporation may forgo profits. If, then,
business corporations can lawfully pursue such worthy non-monetary objectives
as those cited, the Court reasoned, there is no reason they do not have the legal
power to further religious objectives as well.120 Here too, the Court did not at-
tempt to rationalize the religious aspect of the three companies as somehow con-
sistent with profit maximization because the record clearly indicated that it was
not.121
In addition, the Court recognized that many business corporations are not or-
ganized “in order to maximize profit.”122 Many companies regard that form of
organization as beneficial for other reasons, the Court pointed out, such as the
freedom to lobby or campaign for political candidates.123 Here, the Court is
clearly rejecting as overly simplistic the supposed stark and binary nature of cor-
porations, to the effect that one type, non-profits, cannot and do not distribute
any profits they may generate, while the other type, so-called “for-profits,” must
and do singularly seek to maximize profits for the benefit of their shareholders.
Instead, the Court recognized that companies fall along a spectrum,124 with
some maximizing profits, others coupling the pursuit of profits with other
non-monetary objectives, and yet others (non-profits) not distributing profits
to owners/members at all.125
As to the source of its views on corporate purpose, the Court, as it has done
before in describing the attributes of corporateness,126 turned to state law.127
The Court cited to the same provisions in Oklahoma’s and Pennsylvania’s gen-
eral incorporation laws as the treatises it had earlier cited do more generally.128
Here again, however, the Court’s treatment of this critical issue was extremely
sparse, and there was stronger authority available than it recognized. For example,
section 102 of the Pennsylvania corporate statute pointedly states that “a” (not
“the”) purpose of a for-profit corporation can be to “pursue” (not “maximize”)
profits and that profit may be an “incidental” (not the “sole” or even “primary”)
118. We thus disagree with Professor J. Robert Brown’s interpretation of this point. See J. Robert
Brown Jr., Corporate Governance, Profit Maximization and Hobby Lobby (Part 1), RACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG
( July 10, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://goo.gl/HO1Lal; J. Robert Brown Jr., Corporate Governance, Profit
Maximization and Hobby Lobby (Part 2), RACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG ( July 11, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://
goo.gl/KjG7hp.
119. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 48.
122. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
123. Id.
124. For a description of this “spectrum” or continuum idea, see Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Cor-
porate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corporations, 25 REGENT L. REV. 269, 280 (2013).
125. Hobby Lobby, 124 S. Ct. at 2771.
126. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) (“[T]he corporation . . .
owes its existence and attributes to state law.”); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).
127. The Court stated: “[T]he objectives that may properly be pursued by the companies in these
cases are governed by the laws of the states in which they are incorporated.” Hobby Lobby, 124 S. Ct.
at 2771.
128. Id.; see supra note 114.
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purpose of a “for-profit” corporation.129 Pennsylvania thus explicitly authorizes
business corporations to have mixed purposes, only one of which need be to
“pursue” profit, and even that may be an “incidental” purpose.130
However frustratingly terse, the upshot of the Court’s assessment of state cor-
porate law is to free the three companies—and others—from some imagined
state law mandate to maximize profits at the expense of other activities or values.
Being legally free to do more than simply pursue profits, the Court concluded
that they necessarily were legally free to “exercise religion.” Consequently, the
Court held, business companies could invoke RFRA’s protection of their right
to exercise religion against the contraceptive mandate of the ACA.131 But in
reaching that conclusion, grounded as it is on the Court’s understanding of
state corporate law, the opinion extends far beyond the religious context of
the Hobby Lobby case itself. The Court’s view of corporate law’s permissive
ambit means that such avowed goals as social justice, environmental concerns,
and employee welfare, as well as various charitable, humanitarian, and other so-
cially responsible pursuits, emerge as legally possible for business corporations;
and these are valid ends in themselves, not merely means toward the goal of
profits. The Court thus effectively addressed a core trait of the business corpo-
ration’s legal ontology, not just by saying what it is—a “person”—but also by ex-
pansively interpreting what it can do—i.e., pursue a host of objectives besides
just making money.
This portion of the Hobby Lobby opinion is a landmark in corporate law. Never
before had the highest court in the land spoken to an issue that goes to the very
foundation of corporate law, namely, corporate purpose. Understandably,
thoughtful people have differing views on the normative question of what pur-
pose(s) a business corporation should pursue.132 But the longstanding debate
about corporate purpose goes even to the descriptive question of what the law
really is on this point.133 Sparse, highly ambiguous authority on this baseline
issue has served only to fuel—and prolong—the disagreement.134 Critically,
moreover, unless corporations are legally free to pursue non-pecuniary objec-
tives as ends in themselves, any talk of “corporate social responsibility” is of
no moment because various supposedly laudable pursuits could not be ad-
vanced anyway. They would be ultra vires. Only with legal freedom is corporate
social responsibility even possible, just as such freedom was essential to the con-
clusion in Hobby Lobby that business corporations can exercise religion.
The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby thus took a decidedly pluralistic view of
corporate purpose135 and renounced the widely (though not universally) held
129. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 131).
130. Id.
131. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751, 2785. For thoughts about how courts should determine
whether corporations are exercising religion, see McDonnell, supra note 117.
132. See supra Part III.B.
133. See supra Part III.B.
134. See supra Part III.B.
135. See Johnson, supra note 124, at 279−81 (describing corporate pluralism).
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view that maximization of profits is legally mandated as the sole corporate pur-
pose.136 Business corporations are not required to maximize profits and they vi-
olate no state law mandate when, as is frequently the case, they engage in activ-
ities that sacrifice profits for other values. Those activities can include “exercising
religion,” as well as voluntarily going beyond the law’s requirements to promote
environmental sustainability or the well-being of employees, even where that
means reduced profits. So, when the organizers of Hobby Lobby and the
other corporations involved in this case chose to temper their commercial ambi-
tions with religious commitments at the time of incorporation, they acted law-
fully under state law.
This conclusion was, of course, crucial to the Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby
that corporations can exercise religion under RFRA, a federal law. But this
view of corporate purpose was rooted in the Court’s larger understanding of
state corporate law, and thus the opinion has potentially far-reaching conse-
quences for corporate law and corporate activity that extend beyond the issue
of religious liberty. In Part V, we address these possible consequences while
also taking up some lingering uncertainties as to the full reach of the Hobby
Lobby decision for corporate law.
V. THE CORPORATE LAW AFTERMATH OF HOBBY LOBBY
Justice Ginsburg began her dissent in Hobby Lobby by characterizing the ma-
jority’s decision as one “of startling breadth.”137 Justice Kennedy’s brief concur-
rence disputed that description, stating the “opinion does not have the breadth
and sweep ascribed to it by the respectful and powerful dissent.”138 In this Part,
we explore the reach of the majority opinion, but do so specifically with respect
to its implications for corporate law. We take up several dimensions of this issue,
emphasizing areas where the decision made a genuine breakthrough but also
where some questions remain and where disagreement already is emerging.139
A. HOBBY LOBBY’S IMPACT ON STATE CORPORATE LAW
In addressing the application of RFRA to a business corporation, Hobby Lobby
addressed an issue of federal law. But to do so it necessarily addressed a state law
136. See, e.g., supra note 15.
137. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
139. See, e.g., Haskell Murray, Lyman Johnson—Hobby Lobby, a Landmark Corporate Law Decision,
BUS. L. PROF BLOG ( July 2, 2014), http://goo.gl/7BAmgz (offering Professor Johnson’s interpretation of
the Court’s Hobby Lobby ruling); Stephen Bainbridge, Does Hobby Lobby Sound a Death Knell for
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM ( July 3, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://goo.gl/g7e34g
(offering Professor Bainbridge’s response to Professor Johnson’s interpretation of Hobby Lobby);
Alan Meese, Hobby Lobby and Corporate Social Responsibility, BISHOP MADISON ( July 5, 2014, 12:58
AM), http://goo.gl/hTFwsU (discussing the academic commentary in response to Hobby Lobby);
J. Robert Brown Jr., Corporate Governance, Profit Maximization and Hobby Lobby (Part 2), THERACE-
TOTHEBOTTOM.ORG ( July 11, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://goo.gl/KjG7hp (discussing the Court’s analysis
in Hobby Lobby and arguing that the decision does not provide any “meaningful guidance” on corpo-
rate purpose).
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question, the issue of corporate purpose, as the Court itself noted.140 There is, of
course, neither a federal general incorporation statute nor a federal common law
of corporations. Instead, outside the area of constitutional rights,141 the Supreme
Court routinely looks to state law as the source of rules specifying corporate at-
tributes,142 just as it did in Hobby Lobby. In doing so, it seeks to ascertain that law
solely from state law sources, here, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania statutory and de-
cisional law and also general principles of corporate law common to all state stat-
utes. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court did not describe state law as unsettled
or uncertain on the issue of corporate purpose; instead, it had no difficulty con-
cluding that state corporate law simply does not require profit maximization.143
In doing so, the Court cited not only Oklahoma and Pennsylvania statutes con-
taining language similar to that in every corporate statute, it cited two corporate
law treatises that referred more generally to those types of statutes.144 The Court’s
reasoning on the issue would thus seem to extend to all corporations in all states.
But the Court’s views on corporate purpose would not be binding in the con-
text of a state law dispute on the issue of permitted (or mandated) corporate pur-
pose, if the state’s highest court had decided otherwise or the state legislature
had amended the corporate statute.145 Thus, if a reprise of the eBay litigation146
should appear, where the corporate purpose issue was quite briefly and inade-
quately addressed,147 the Delaware Court of Chancery would presumably treat
the Hobby Lobby opinion as highly persuasive, but the Delaware Supreme
Court would not be bound to follow Hobby Lobby’s reading of the breadth of cor-
porate purpose.
At the same time, given that the Chancery Court in eBay,148 like the Michigan
Supreme Court in its 1919 decision of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,149 cited no legal
authority for its views on corporate purpose,150 an opinion of the United States
140. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775 (majority opinion).
141. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (corporations have
First Amendment free speech rights).
142. See supra notes 126−27 and accompanying text.
143. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
144. Id.
145. See Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (noting that “the interpretation of the
Idaho statute by the Idaho Supreme Court would be binding on federal courts”). We note, however,
that besides the support of the State of Oklahoma, the Attorneys General of twenty other states sup-
ported Hobby Lobby and took a broad view of corporate purpose in their amicus brief. Brief for States
of Michigan, Ohio and 18 Other States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17–25, Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356). Among the two co-authors
of that brief was the Attorney General of Michigan. That brief rather conspicuously did not cite the
Michigan Supreme Court decision of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), one of the
rare opinions addressing corporate purpose, however briefly. See supra Part III.B (discussing Dodge
and its impact on corporate purpose).
146. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
147. See supra Part III.B.
148. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 35.
149. 170 N.W. at 684 (distinguishing the case presented from cases cited by counsel); see also
Brief for States of Michigan, Ohio and 18 Other States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra note 145, at 3 (arguing that corporations do not need to maximize profits).
150. See Johnson, supra note 124, at 274–75.
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Supreme Court, speaking with the force noted in Part IV above, will be impos-
sible to ignore—and exceedingly difficult to disagree with.151 This is especially
the case given that in order to reach the conclusion that business corporations
can “exercise religion” under RFRA, the Court necessarily had to first rule that
state corporate law permitted corporations to pursue that objective because it es-
chews categorical profit maximization. A state supreme court might disagree
with that ruling, but a ruling of the United States Supreme Court it is, and
given the paucity of counter authority, it carries highly persuasive, if not author-
itative, weight unless and until displaced by a state’s highest court or legislative
action. Moreover, state law silence in the face of Hobby Lobby, or failure of a state
to disagree with it, means the opinion will retain its persuasive force. And in the
highly unlikely event a state were to somehow act to mandate profit maximiza-
tion, companies could easily reincorporate elsewhere, perhaps in Oklahoma or
Pennsylvania, to the fiscal disadvantage of the former state of incorporation.
In the competitive corporate chartering world, of course, states do not typically
act to drive businesses away.
Finally, the Hobby Lobby opinion serves to vindicate and validate the common
business practice of choosing not to maximize profits. As the Court remarked, “it
is not at all uncommon for . . . corporations to further humanitarian and other
objectives.”152 This judicial endorsement likely will further legitimate corporate
goals other than profit maximization. Much of what is done in the corporate
arena today is not the product of mandatory legal rules, but a confluence of busi-
ness lore, ingrained practices, market forces, professional education, and other
non-legal influences, as noted in Part III. These factors are fluid, and the
Hobby Lobby opinion both reflects and can facilitate the ongoing shift in the
norms of corporate purpose to align with broad societal expectations of corpo-
rate behavior. Movement away from pure profit seeking, moreover, is by no
means limited to advancing religious objectives but can include an array of
goals thought by corporate decision makers to be “socially responsible” for
purely secular reasons. Voluntary action in this regard can be an efficient, pos-
itive, and non-statist influence on corporate conduct, but it depends on first ap-
preciating a corporation’s broad legal freedom to so act, which the Hobby Lobby
opinion legitimates.
B. CLOSELY HELD ONLY OR ALL CORPORATIONS?
All three corporations in Hobby Lobby were closely held, family-controlled
companies. Is the Court’s ruling limited to those types of corporations, or
does it apply to all corporations, including those that are publicly held? If the
151. In a forthcoming article co-authored by Chief Justice Leo Strine, for example, the authors agree
that Hobby Lobby explicitly holds that “profit is not the sole end of corporate governance.” Strine &
Walker, supra note 68, at 13 n.13. Delaware has taken notice of Hobby Lobby.
152. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014). The Court, in speaking
of pursuing profit at the expense of everything else, noted too that “many [corporations] do not do
so.” Id.
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former, what exactly is a “closely held” corporation? To be sure, Justice Alito em-
phasized the closely held nature of the companies throughout the opinion, and
he stated expressly that the case did “not involve publicly traded corporations”
and “we have no occasion in these cases to consider RFRA’s applicability to
such companies.”153
Still, nothing in the majority’s reasoning limits the type of companies to which
it applies. Justice Alito himself said only that it was “unlikely” that public com-
panies would assert RFRA claims, due to “numerous practical restraints.”154 The
involvement of institutional investors in public corporations made it “improba-
ble” that religious beliefs would be drawn on to run such a company, Alito ob-
served.155 Moreover, it is important to distinguish the federal RFRA “exercise of
religion” aspect of the case—where, practically speaking, public companies
likely will not so act—from the state law issue of freedom to do so because
state law does not mandate profit maximization. State law legally permits all cor-
porations to exercise religion, but whether a particular corporation does so is up
to its organizers and its board of directors. That key point pertains to all
corporations.
The corporate treatises and corporate statutes cited by Justice Alito on freedom
to act in a non-profit-maximizing manner are not limited in application to
closely held corporations.156 This is necessarily the case because there is, in
state corporate law, no basis for contending that the general incorporation stat-
ute—and judicial interpretations of it—do not apply categorically to all compa-
nies, except where the statute itself provides otherwise.157 There is thus no prin-
cipled basis for construing the Court’s views on profit maximization as limited to
closely held corporations as a matter of law. In ruling that a closely held corpo-
ration need not maximize profits, the Court looked to state law sources equally
applicable to public companies.
C. SHAREHOLDER UNANIMITY?
On the facts of the Hobby Lobby case, all of the stockholders, directors, and
officers of the three corporations supported the religious thrust of the business
operations.158 One commentator quickly seized on two brief phrases in the ma-
jority opinion to suggest that such internal unanimity might be essential to the
Court’s endorsement of a corporation’s non-profit-maximizing purpose.159 We
disagree.
153. Id. at 2774.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2771, 2775.
157. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2014) (referring to § 7.32).
158. See supra notes 37–54 and accompanying text.
159. Meese, supra note 139. Professor Bainbridge’s first Hobby Lobby blog post on this point is
more equivocal. Bainbridge, supra note 139. He cites authority that discusses the prerogatives of
the holders of a “majority” of stock, and then mentions only “a consensus.” Id.
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The Court stated that business corporations, “with ownership approval, sup-
port a wide variety of charitable causes.”160 And the Court also said, “[s]o long as
its owners agree,” a corporation may deviate from profit maximization.161 One
might be tempted to construe the words “with ownership approval” and “so
long as owners agree” as implying that all must so agree.162 But that simply is
not what those passages say or mean. Nowhere does the Court use the words
“all” or “unanimous” or anything like them. Justice Alito, in this portion of the
opinion, is not addressing the nuances of the voting rules for shareholders
under state corporate law, which, in any event, are governed by stronger or
weaker versions of a majoritarian principle, not rules of unanimity.163 He is sim-
ply saying that, by whatever process the requisite level of “ownership approval”
is obtained, corporations ultimately take actions consistent with how the “own-
ers agree.”
Moreover, in responding to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, Justice Alito explicitly
takes up the question of “disputes among the owners of corporations.”164 He ac-
knowledges that “the owners of a company might well have a dispute relating to
religion.”165 If so, then necessarily all shareholders do not agree on business pol-
icy and unanimity is lacking. But that does not mean that, lacking unanimous
agreement, the business must seek to maximize profits. It means precisely
what Justice Alito then notes: “State corporate law provides a ready means for
resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish
its governing structure. . . . Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying
state law in resolving disputes.”166 And as noted,167 the default voting rule in
corporate governance is a lower threshold than unanimity. The treatise to
which Alito cites at this point in his opinion refers, quite conventionally, to “sim-
ple majority vote.”168
Further, on questions of business policy, including strategic and operational
decisions that sacrifice profits for other considerations, shareholders ordinarily
160. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. As noted at supra note 97, we think reference to sharehold-
ers as “owners” of the corporation is legally incorrect and potentially misleading and, in any event,
unnecessary.
161. Id.
162. Meese, supra note 139, at 3. Professor Meese cites to an earlier article he co-authored in
which the unanimity position was advocated. Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Corporate Law
and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM
273, 284–85 (2014). The cited article preceded the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hobby Lobby. In a
later, post-Hobby Lobby blog post, replying to a post by Lyman Johnson, A “Missing Person”—the “Cor-
poration,” CONGLOMERATE ( July 17, 2014), http://goo.gl/J8CCXn, Professor Meese clarified that una-
nimity by shareholders was sufficient but not necessary. Alan Meese, Hobby Lobby, Shareholder Pri-
macy and Profit Maximization, CONGLOMERATE ( July 17, 2014), http://goo.gl/D9fySk.
163. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.25(c) (2014).
164. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
165. Id. at 2775. He cites as an example some stockholders wishing to remain open on
the Sabbath to make more money while other stockholders might want to close for religious
reasons. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 162.
168. COX & HAZEN, supra note 82, § 14.11.
Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby 27
have no voting rights at all. It is for the board of directors to decide such ques-
tions,169 and even in the boardroom unanimity is not required. If the sharehold-
ers disagree with a board-level decision, their primary recourse will be the an-
nual election of directors, where collective action costs and rational apathy
severely limit the efficacy of voting rights in public companies. While it is
true that in closely held corporations controlling shareholders exercise broad
decision-making influence, as a legal matter they act in their capacity as direc-
tors, not as shareholders, and here too unanimity is not required absent an un-
usual charter or bylaw provision.
In short, by acting appropriately through the legally mandated corporate gov-
ernance structure, shareholders and directors can chart business policy. One as-
pect of this is deciding how, if at all, religious or other philosophical or social
policy beliefs will play a role in shaping that strategy. As the key decision-makers
address that question, the usual default governance and majoritarian voting
rules will apply, not a highly unusual unanimity rule that would obtain only
if specifically agreed ex ante. The decision to engage in—or refrain from—
non-maximizing of profits behavior of all sorts will thus be decided in the cus-
tomary way under standard corporate law rules.
D. A PROFIT-MAXIMIZATION DEFAULT RULE?
As we traced in Part III, there is a long and ongoing controversy about corpo-
rate purpose in the United States. Corporate law itself offers scant authority and
is best characterized, we believe, as agnostic and broadly permissive on corpo-
rate purpose. Thus, although it is likely safe to describe profit-maximizing beha-
vior as a “norm” or “common practice” in the corporate realm—and setting aside
the somewhat unusual Revlon setting in Delaware170—it is not correct to de-
scribe it as a binding legal “rule.” The norm, moreover, is likely far stronger in
the public corporation setting than in the close corporation context. The profit
maximization norm, whatever the prescriptive case for it, is, descriptively, a
product of deep-seated business lore and practices, market pressures, and pro-
fessional education, not law. Those who contend otherwise have little to support
their position on such a first-order issue.
While rejecting the notion of a mandatory profit-maximization rule, the Hobby
Lobby case also implicitly holds that there is no default rule to that effect either.
Tellingly, the Court spoke to the question of corporate purpose without reliance
on or reference to any modification of or “contracting around” some supposed
background maximization rule. The Hobby Lobby Stores company had a state-
ment of corporate purpose,171 and Conestoga Wood Specialties had a Vision and
Values Statement,172 but neither company addressed these issues in their articles
of incorporation. Also, the authority to which the Court in Hobby Lobby cited on
169. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
170. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
171. See supra note 44.
172. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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the corporate purpose question173—scant, as noted174—were references to gen-
erally applicable provisions of state corporation statutes, not to contractually
agreed departures from those provisions.
For several additional reasons we believe the Hobby Lobby decision will have a
positive influence on discussions about corporate purpose, and the question of
the presence or absence of a default rule on that subject under current corporate
law. First, as observed already, the Court’s opinion validates both the business
and legal legitimacy of a non-profit-maximizing approach to business, in the re-
ligious context but also beyond it. This could actually encourage express provi-
sions to this effect. Such an authoritative sanctioning of a non-pecuniary objec-
tive in the corporate sector can itself play a role in softening the strong corporate
norm of profit maximization, if not altogether shifting it. Second, given the high
visibility of Hobby Lobby, business participants and their counsel likely will, if
this is deemed important, attend more deliberately to the issue of corporate ob-
jective(s) in the corporation’s organizational and governing instruments and in
the disclosures made to prospective investors about corporate objectives. If so,
the default rule (whatever it is) becomes irrelevant anyway.
Third, for those who think there currently is a default rule on profit maximiza-
tion in corporate law, the Hobby Lobby decision may prompt new thinking as to
whether there should be a single default rule for all corporations. Given that sur-
veys continue to reveal the important role of religious (and other non-commercial)
beliefs in American life,175 and given the far more extensive participation of
shareholders in all aspects of a close corporation than in the affairs of a public
corporation, perhaps it is sensible to presume a greater harmony between per-
sonal belief and business goals in close corporations than in the public corpora-
tion, where a sharper focus on return on investment may be more prevalent. The
dramatic rise in adoption of benefit corporation statutes,176 adverted to in the
Court’s opinion,177 shows the law’s responsiveness to a perceived desire to com-
bine the pursuit of profits with other social goals in business. The Hobby Lobby
case highlights this not uncommon congruence of personal conviction and busi-
ness practice in the close corporation. Unless state law is to require participants
in close corporations to use a benefit corporation to pursue non-commercial pur-
poses along with profits, the wisdom of a default rule of profit maximization in
the general corporation statute should be rethought for close corporations.
Both as a behavioral and theoretical matter, one has to wonder whether, if nat-
ural persons are not generally presumed in our legal system to be single-minded
money maximizers in all facets of their daily lives, why in corporate law they
173. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
174. See supra Part IV.
175. See, e.g., PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY (2008), available
at www.religions-pewforum.org/reports (describing religious affiliation and beliefs in the United
States).
176. More than one-half of all states now authorize the formation of benefit corporations. See
State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-
legislative-status (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
177. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 n.25.
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should be presumed to be such in their role as investors, at least in the closely
held business setting if not in holding public company stock. In sweeping so cat-
egorically across investors in corporations of all sorts, adherents of the manda-
tory or default profit-maximizing camp make a simplifying assumption about
human behavior that lacks nuance, and that may itself hobble efforts to achieve
better balance among monetary and non-monetary goals within the corporate
world, just as the humans associated with those corporations strive for balance
throughout their lives. At the same time, we recognize that some, perhaps many,
persons with strong religious convictions may well choose to maximize financial
well-being in and outside the corporate setting. They are legally free to do so.
Finally, all three corporations involved in Hobby Lobby sought to advance a
corporate purpose that went beyond making profits. Although the shareholders
involved in those companies agreed on this objective, under standard corporate
governance rules it is the board of directors that charts a firm’s strategic direc-
tion. And the board is free to advance the corporation’s mixed objectives over
the objections of shareholders and at the expense of strict shareholder primacy.
Thus, Hobby Lobby illustrates that the business corporation is a legal person pos-
sessing an identity distinct from the humans involved in it, and that it can have
an institutional purpose distinct from that of its shareholders. In this way, the
centrality of the corporate entity is restored to corporate law, rather than adher-
ing to a conception of the corporation as identical to the body of shareholders
both as to legal personhood and corporate goals.
Once the interests of the corporation itself, not simply the welfare of its share-
holders, is made the focal point of legal and business analysis, the issue of both its
rights and its “responsibilities” can be more squarely addressed. Corporate respon-
sibilities can be mandated by laws requiring specified corporate behavior, as in the
ACA itself. Corporate responsibility also can be addressed, however, by voluntary
actions that exceed legal mandates, whether motivated by religion or by other
philosophical, ethical, or social policy convictions. Shareholders can contribute
to this and can derive benefit from it, but neither they nor other constituencies
are the responsible “corporate” actor, in the eyes of the law or in society at large.
The Court in Hobby Lobby, however incomplete and thin its analysis, upheld a
strong version of corporate personhood distinct from that of its associated constit-
uencies and a strong version of corporate freedom to pursue mixed objectives, not
just corporate profits or shareholder financial welfare. In doing so, the Court cer-
tainly did not discuss or engage modern corporate theory, but neither did it do as
the “nexus of contracts” version of that theory does and essentially disregard the
corporation altogether as the focal point of analysis.178 By taking corporate per-
sonhood seriously, the Court endorsed the business corporation as a flexible
legal arrangement possessing an inherent freedom to pursue a range of institu-
tional goals, including but not limited to profit maximization. The robust corpo-
rate actor that emerges from Hobby Lobby is thus more complex than the narrow
178. For a description of the modern “nexus of contracts” theory of the corporation, see Millon,
supra note 84, at 1033–34.
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profit-maximizing, shareholder-centric version of modern theory, but for that very
reason it is fully amenable to debates about what its behavior should be. With ex-
press recognition of the freedom to do more than simply seek to maximize profits
may come a growing social demand that business corporations act to advance
other goals. Corporate theory will then have to adjust accordingly.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Hobby Lobby decision has drawn sharp criticism from advocates of wo-
men’s reproductive freedom. Others have expressed concern over the possible
future repercussions of a religion-based “exemption” from federal statutes and
regulations. Without expressing our views on the merits of these concerns, we
argue in this article that critics have overlooked the very important—and in
our view very positive—implications of Hobby Lobby for corporate law.
The Supreme Court was correct to conclude that Hobby Lobby and the other
corporations are “persons” capable of “exercising religion” for purposes of the
RFRA. The notion that corporations are persons existing in the eyes of the
law, separately from those human persons associated with each other in pursuit
of a common enterprise, is well settled as a matter of state corporate law. More
controversial is the idea that business corporations—the Court refers to them as
“for-profits”—are legally free to “exercise religion” and are capable of doing so.
There is no legal basis for the argument that business corporations may do noth-
ing more than seek to maximize profits. No statute says that and judicial prece-
dent to that effect is almost non-existent; the few cases that might be cited pro-
vide exceedingly weak support for the supposed profit-maximization
requirement. To the contrary, the statutes relevant to this case—like all other
state business corporation statutes—specifically provide that business corpora-
tions may be organized “for any lawful purpose.”
As for the question whether a business corporation is capable of “exercising
religion,” this presents no conceptual or practical difficulties. A corporation
can act in this area just as it does when it executes a contract, files a lawsuit,
or commits a crime or tort. That is, it acts through legally authorized human be-
ings. That means, of course, the corporation’s board of directors and the officers
to whom the board has delegated authority.
The importance of the Hobby Lobby case extends far beyond the specific ques-
tion of religious freedom. Here the United States Supreme Court speaks clearly
to the fundamental issue of corporate purpose and states correctly that corporate
law authorizes non-profit-maximizing behavior. Business corporations are free to
engage in a wide range of activities that sacrifice profits for other values. They
can, for example, devote resources to environmental sustainability or to worker
well-being even if that means a reduction in net income. And they can do so even
without insisting that the results will enhance the company’s long-run profitabil-
ity. This, of course, is precisely the legal position advocated by supporters of cor-
porate social responsibility. We hope that Hobby Lobby’s critics will appreciate
the importance of this aspect of the Court’s holding.
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